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interval on estimation of its magnitude ; the influence of nervous excitants, narcotics, and antipyretics on mental work ; estimation of magnitude by the sense of touch ; concomitant movements ; a psychophysiological reflexion ; pleasure and pain.

FRANK ANGELL.

Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa in ihrem geschichtlichen Zusammenhange. Dargestellt von A. SCHMEKEL. Berlin, Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1892. — pp. viii, 483.

It will probably be long before another great and comprehensive work on Greek philosophy like that of Zeller will appear again. Ritter was supplanted by Brandis, and Brandis in turn has been supplanted by Zeller. But the comprehensiveness of the last named work, united with its unrivalled mastery of details, will for many years make a similar undertaking needless, and it seems probable that for generations the Berlin professor will hold the field against all comers. This, however, by no means precludes the usefulness of monographs on special subjects, and in this way much remains to be done. Several years ago Zeller expressed the wish that especially the post-Aristotelian philosophy might be subjected to a more searching investigation and criticism, and this book on the Middle Stoa comes to us in some measure fulfilling that wish. Schmekel has chosen an interesting subject, and has handled it in a masterful fashion. It is not a German monograph *à la mode*, filled with philological quibbles, learned lumber, and masses of undigested and ill-arranged facts mountain-high. The work is written with philosophical spirit and vigor ; at the same time it exhibits a skilful employment of the right canons of historical criticism, and the hand of the precise philologist is not missed. Susemihl, in the preface to his *History of Greek Literature in the Alexandrine period*, mentions important help derived from Schmekel's volume, the MSS. of which he had used while preparing his history. (The Middle Stoa was published a year later than Susemihl's work.) The field covered by Schmekel is, to be sure, a small one, and at first sight one might be inclined to express both surprise and disapproval that a considerable octavo should be devoted to these later Stoics of whose writings very meagre fragments are extant. The book, however, is by no means a parallel to that monument of painstaking and misdirected genius, Lassalle's *Herakleitos*. In the first place, the fragments which we possess are considerably supplemented by explanations of later writers, and besides we have the fundamental doctrines of the Stoic

school to begin with ; in the second place, approved standards of criticism and interpretation are employed instead of ingenious, but erratic, conjecture. The author devotes a score of pages to the few biographical facts which are authenticated. Most of this information is, of course, derived from Diogenes Laertius and Cicero. The philosophers whom he classifies in this so-called Middle Stoa are Panaetius, Posidonius, and the minor writers Hecaton, Mnesarchus, and Dionysius. He then turns his attention to the sources of our information about the philosophers in question. This occupies, if we regard the book as a work in the history of philosophy, a somewhat disproportionate space, and in this portion of the treatise we think Schmekel rather over-ready to see resemblances, and to find evidence of source in similarity of style or thought that is more imaginary than real (*cf.* pp. 104, 110 ff.). Thereupon follows his exposition proper of the philosophical doctrines, their relation to preceding systems, and their influence on succeeding speculation, more particularly on skepticism, mysticism, and the Roman *Aufklärung*.

While the academy was growing more and more dogmatic, the Stoics were becoming more and more skeptical. Both Panaetius and Posidonius were strongly under the influence of Karneades, and owing to the political influence and diplomatic prominence of philosophers like Panaetius and Posidonius, philosophy assumed more and more the form of a propædæutic to oratory, — a preliminary education for state service. Panaetius of Rhodes, the friend of the young Scipio and of Laelius, differed from the earlier Stoics, as Ritter says, in being less stringent in his scientific procedure, in popularizing philosophy, and in making it the subject matter for an elaborate and polished oratory. In this way he skilfully made an entrance for Stoic philosophy into Rome. His lectures were listened to by the celebrated advocates of the everlasting city, and philosophy was carried beyond the precincts of the school proper. Under these circumstances, as might be surmised, logic and physics were neglected, and ethics brought into prominence. According to the few works whose titles we still have, his writing was confined to ethics, and politics ; the book on Sokrates and the Sokratics being probably ethical. Panaetius received his philosophical inspiration and instruction chiefly from Diogenes of Babylonia, the Stoic, but more especially from Diogenes' successor, Antipater. Besides, he came under the influence of the peripatetic, Kritolaos, and of the Academician, Karneades. It was just at the time when Karneades laid down his office as head of the academy, that Panaetius became the

Stoic scholar. Panaetius, wealthy and politely trained in the school of the world, the companion of Scipio on his diplomatic mission to the Orient, an habitu   of Rome's aristocratic society, was naturally a potent factor in the philosophical propaganda of Greece in Rome, but except in insignificant details his mission was not to create. As head of the Stoic school, however, and as teacher and expositor, he was one of the most efficient spirits in its history. In literary activity and productiveness he was surpassed by his pupil and successor, Posidonius, whose writings, as was the fashion of that time and as the status of science then permitted, were encyclop  dic, covering the subjects of ethics, theology, physics, cosmology, psychology. Of the three minor later Stoics mentioned by Schmekel, so little is known of their dogmas and so meagre are the traditions of their influence on the progress of philosophy in general and the development of the Stoic school in particular, that their names in the history of speculation are well-nigh meaningless, unless one should make exception of the polemic of Dionysius against the epistemology of the Epikurean Demetrios.

On the basis of a statement of Phantias in a treatise "On the School of Posidonius," Diogenes Laertius (vii. 33) says that both Panaetius and Posidonius began their philosophies with physics. But we have very few references to the physics of Panaetius. Schmekel, however, simply ascribes to him on the grounds of *a priori* probability such Stoic doctrines as were peculiar to the school and fundamental to it, *e.g.*, as a Stoic he must have accepted the doctrine of the corporeality of everything. These he supplements by such references as subsequent writers make to his physics. Further, every Stoic rejected all purely mechanical theories of the world and established a monism, in which he affirmed the unity of spirit and matter, and which one may label dynamic materialism. This fundamental conception no Stoic could reject without separating himself radically from the school. One cannot, to be sure, go very far on an hypothesis like this. The difficulty very soon presents itself, what doctrines of the school we are to regard as fundamental. Although this is somewhat indefinite and unsatisfactory, it affords us, perhaps, the best working basis we can get for a reconstruction of the system of the philosopher. At the same time, we have always to bear in mind that it is only a reconstructed system, and that the data for such reconstruction are by no means complete; but the judicial and critical way in which the sources are first examined and then employed, furnishes, we admit, well authenticated data (as far

as they go) for reconstructing Panaetius' philosophy. But they are not adequate, and so, like an architectural restoration of the Acropolis, where our information as to details is defective, we must regard such procedure as largely conjectural, admitting at the same time that the conjecture is on the side of probability. In any case, the revived forms, as Schmekel presents them to us, are certainly preferable to ruins, and give us a more edifying and a more correct picture of what was.

To illustrate the internal relationship and relative worth of the several disciplines of philosophy, Posidonius employed the bones, sinews, fleshy parts, and the soul of an animal, saying that these corresponded to logic, physics, and ethics respectively. This illustration, as Diogenes Laertius (vii. 33) says, was used by Zeno, Chrysippos Apollodoros, and others. Schmekel, in misleading fashion, cites it in such way as to leave the impression that it was peculiar to Posidonius. As, in the case of the body, no one of these parts can exist without the others, although they have different values, so, too, in philosophy all three are necessary, albeit ethics is the most important.

Posidonius was a believer in divination. The soul in his anthropology had a pre-existence; this is quite as definitely taught by him as by Plato. The possibility of experience depends, on the one hand, on the fact that there is causality in all process, and on the other, on the nature of human mind. For the human mind, as part of the divine and universal spirit, has the same nature as this, and man is therefore by his nature fitted to recognize through observation this causal rule of God, and in some measure to predict its course. This he does either by means of science or of divination (*mantic*), the latter of which was rejected by Panaetius. Every science is based on observation. It is through this that thought takes cognizance of cause and effect, and hence the theory that all science is pure product of human thought and of human experience. The perfect science would then consist in a knowledge of the totality of causal relationships. If one knew this, one would have the entire future before one's eyes. This, however, is possible for God only; as compensation for this limitation man has been given *mantic* or the gift of divination. This rests on the same basis as science, *viz.*, observation. It is not prediction of the accidental, but of the necessary, inasmuch as everything takes place by an inexorable necessity. The world is, moreover, constructed in such way by the divinity that given events are preceded by given signs; these signs are declared

in dreams, oracles, clairvoyance, astrology, the flight of birds, etc., etc.

In the organic world plants occupy the lowest place (*cf.* Aristotle). Next come the lower animals, between which and the vegetable world there are transitional forms, *i.e.*, plant-animals or zoöphytes. Inasmuch as all life depends on the penetration of matter by the cosmical pneuma, the life of plants must be an expression of this same principle; it is the lowest form in which the principle can appear as life. This power in the plant is confined to nutrition and propagation, and to this faculty the name of φύσις is given. On a plane higher than plants, and forming the transition to the animal world, are those organisms to which the desiderative faculty (ἐπιθυμητικόν) attaches. Schmekel criticizes Zeller's statement (p. 257 f.) about this faculty. But Zeller, in the passage quoted by Schmekel, does not make the distinction attributed to him. Schmekel misreads the words of Galen: προσπεφυκότα δίκην φυλῶν πέτραις ἢ τισιν ἐτέροις τοιούτοις. The reference is not to plants, but to those animals which have a plant-like nature, to zoöphytes. To the animal kingdom proper ψυχή is ascribed. In addition to φύσις and ἐπιθυμητικόν, Posidonius ascribes the Platonic faculty θυμοειδές to the animal kingdom. This, a kind of will-instinct, supplies the impulse to self-preservation and the attainment of the objects of desire. To man alone belongs pure reason (λόγος, νοῦς). Just as the soul is constituted, so will its moral attitude and activity be; ethics is, therefore, made to depend on psychology. The supreme law of conduct with Posidonius, as with the Stoics generally, was the conformity of life and conduct to nature. By nature, Posidonius understands, not the universal cosmical law, as other Stoics, but rather man's own nature. This, however, is double, consisting of an animal and a rational nature. The latter has rightfully the leadership; accordingly the ethical end of life is an attitude of the soul in accordance with reason. This psychical condition includes both the true and the good in their entire extent,—the true in knowledge and the good in choice. Both are included in the conception of the wise man, who, from Chrysippos on, represented to the Stoics the moral ideal. Posidonius, however, rejects Chrysippos' conception of the wise man as something unattainable. On the contrary, he believed that the virtue exemplified in the σοφός is attainable; with Chrysippos virtue made demands which transcend human power, so that the wise man, as embodying the ideal of virtue, never actually existed, and this conception of virtue which could not be realized,

had no practical value. Posidonius, on the other hand, on the ground that there was no such thing as an absolutely wise man, and that progress in knowledge was constant, found his ideal in the relatively wise man. One feels that in these later Stoics the stern, unsympathetic, yet heroic spirit of the old philosophers of the Porch had departed; that their theories of conduct and life were becoming accommodated to ideals regnant in a political decline; that we have here to do with speculation no longer creative, but partly inherited from predecessors, partly adopted from other systems; that the Stoic philosophy was becoming an eclecticism; and that all living and quickening power had departed from it. We have, however, to express to the author of the *Philosophie der mittleren Stoa* our gratitude for an extraordinarily clever and painstaking work, which, from the very nature of its subject-matter, will unfortunately have but a small circle of readers, occupied as it is with a somewhat obscure and uninteresting period, when the philosophy of the Greeks, like Greece herself, was rapidly falling into decay.

WILLIAM HAMMOND.

Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft. Eine Kritik der ethischen Grundbegriffe von GEORG SIMMEL, Privatdozent an der Berliner Universität. In zwei Bänden. Erster Band. Berlin, Verlag von Wilhelm Hertz (Bessersche Buchhandlung), 1892. — pp. viii, 467.

A book like the above deserves our closest study. Whatever fault may be found with it — and it has its defects — one thing may be said without fear of contradiction: Dr. Simmel's first volume is ingenious, subtle, and highly suggestive. It is a keen and exhaustive investigation of a number of ethical concepts, critical even to a fault. We might characterize it as one of the least dogmatic treatments of moral questions in existence, in this respect, resembling Sidgwick's maturer work. Whatever view the enthusiastic dogmatist may take of such productions, the careful thinker cannot but welcome this book as a useful addition to the discipline with which it deals. Its object is a commendable one, meagre though the positive results may be. The apparently simple concepts of ethics are shown to be far more complicated than would appear on the surface. An acute analysis of such notions lessens one's desire to venture on the high seas of speculation and inspires one with a wholesome kind of doubt, wholesome because of the intellectual vigilance which it begets. The